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In the term that ended in June 2008, the UnitedStates Supreme Court decided many high visibilityand controversial cases, including cases on capitalpunishment, gun control, employee rights, pre-
emption and the rights of the Guantanamo detainees.
Behind the headlines, however, were other important
cases that received less media and other attention, but
may have a signiﬁcant impact on state and federal court
litigation. For this third annual review of Supreme
Court decisions, I have identiﬁed three cases from very
diﬀerent areas all of which involve the remedies avail-
able for violations of federal law.
These cases deal with the following issues: (a) federal
remedies for state violations of federal labor policy
(Chamber of Commerce); (b) state remedies for viola-
tions of the federal Bill of Rights (Danforth) and (c) fed-
eral common law standards for awarding punitive
damages (Exxon Shipping).
Chamber of Commerce
In Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 128 S.Ct. 2408
(2008) a 7-2 decision written by Justice Stevens, the
Supreme Court held that the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) pre-empted a California statute that prohib-
ited grant recipients and private employers receiving
more than $10,000 in state funds in any year from using
such funds “to assist, promote, or deter union organizing.”
The Court has long applied a federal principle of neutral-
ity under which state and local governments are required
to remain neutral in private labor disputes covered by the
NLRA. Chamber of Commerce does not in any way dis-
turb this policy of neutrality but expressly relies on a rule
of preemption that limits governmental regulation of em-
ployer speech about union organizing. Under federal
labor policy, the resolution of organizing campaigns
should be left to what the Court has described as the “free
play of economic forces.”
The signiﬁcance of Chamber of Commerce is not appar-
ent from the decision. The action was apparently
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by an employer associa-
tion, despite the absence of any explicit reference to §
1983 in the decision. Section 1983, the current version
of §1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, is commonly
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thought of as a civil rights remedy for the enforcement
of federal constitutional standards against defendants
acting under state law. It is surely that, but Chamber of
Commerce illustrates that the Court has interpreted §
1983 broadly to reach violations (under color of state
law) of certain federal statutes, including the NLRA.
Given the breadth of the civil remedy provided by §
1983 (including broad injunctive relief against state oﬃ-
cials, the absence of an exhaustion requirement, and the
availability of attorney fees), Chamber of Commerce il-
lustrates that § 1983 may be a powerful remedy in non-
traditional “civil rights” cases in which business interests
claim that their federal constitutional (or in some cases)
statutory rights have been violated by defendants acting
under color of state law.
Danforth
In Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S.Ct. 1029 (2008), a 7-2
decision written by Justice Stevens, the Court addressed
the power of state courts to provide broader remedies
for constitutional violations than are available under
federal law. Danforth involved the retroactive eﬀect of a
Supreme Court decision adopting a new federal consti-
tutional rule of criminal procedure under which the ad-
mission of a victim's taped interview violated the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The
defendant had been convicted of ﬁrst-degree criminal
sexual conduct with a 6-year-old victim who did not
testify at trial.
After holding that the new rule did not apply retroac-
tively as a matter of federal law, the Minnesota Supreme
Court refused to reach the independent question of
whether state law required the new federal law to be ap-
plied retroactively. Concluding that federal law did not
permit state courts to give federal decisions broader
retroactive eﬀect than federal law required, the state
court aﬃrmed the lower denial of post-conviction relief
without reaching the merits of the state remedial issue.
In reversing the state court decision, the Supreme Court
held that state courts may fashion state remedial rules
that provide greater relief than is available under federal
law. “[T]he remedy a state court chooses to provide its
citizens for violations of the Federal Constitution is pri-
marily a question of state law. Federal law simply sets
certain minimum requirements that States must meet
but may exceed in providing appropriate relief.” Id. at
1045 (quotations omitted).
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied, in part, on
civil decisions addressing the retroactivity of decisions
adopting new constitutional standards for reviewing
discriminatory state tax policies.
[T]o the extent that these civil retroactivity deci-
sions are relevant to the issue before us today, they
support our conclusion that the remedy a state
court chooses to provide its citizens for violations
of the Federal Constitution is primarily a question
of state law. Federal law simply sets certain mini-
mum requirements that States must meet but
may exceed in providing appropriate relief. . . .
They provide no support for the proposition that
federal law places a limit on state authority to
provide remedies for federal constitutional viola-
tions.
Id. at 1045-46 (footnotes and quotations omitted).
The decision in Danforth provides a roadmap for states
that wish to provide broader relief for violations of fed-
eral statutory and constitutional provisions than is re-
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quired under federal law. The decision complements
the emergence of state constitutional law as an impor-
tant source of substantive rights by making clear that
states have broad power to fashion remedies even when
federal law is the underlying source of the substantive
rights. The Danforth Court expressly authorized the use
of expanded state remedies in the criminal case under
consideration, and it recognized that it had permitted
states to develop broader tax remedies (for state viola-
tions of federal constitutional standards) than federal
law requires. Finally, the decision sets the stage for the
broader use of state remedies in cases in which immu-
nity and other doctrines have limited the availability
§1983 and resulted in the denial of all relief to victims of
constitutional wrongdoing.
Exxon Shipping
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605 (2008), a
6-2 decision written by Justice Souter (with Justice Alito
not participating), the Supreme Court vacated a $2.5 bil-
lion award of punitive damages against Exxon Mobil
Corp. for the 1989 environmental disaster in which the
supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground oﬀ the coast of
Alaska and spilled 11 million gallons of crude oil into
Prince William Sound.
Exxon Mobil (the owner of Exxon Shipping) had al-
ready settled state and federal claims for environmental
damage with payments exceeding $1 billion. The con-
solidated action, which was brought in federal court
under maritime jurisdiction, sought economic losses on
behalf of commercial ﬁsherman, Native Alaskans, and
landowners as well as punitive damages on behalf of a
certiﬁed a class of 32,000 plaintiﬀs. The district court
had upheld a jury verdict of $507.5 million in compen-
satory damages and $5 billion in punitive damages, but
the Ninth Circuit ultimately remitted the punitive dam-
age award to $2.5 billion. Only the punitive damages
claim was before the Supreme Court.
Initially, the Court had to decide maritime law permitted a
shipowner to be vicariously liable for punitive damages.
The courts below had imposed liability against Exxon
Mobil for its recklessness in not properly supervising a
managerial employee, the ship’s captain, a known (and
non-recovering) alcoholic. The Supreme Court, however,
was evenly split on this issue, so its non-precedential judg-
ment upheld the decision of the Ninth Circuit and permit-
ted a maritime award of vicarious punitive damages.
After holding that punitive damages were available
notwithstanding the absence of express authorization
under the Clean Water Act (itself an important holding
in support of the broad availability of common law
remedies), the Court addressed the amount of allowable
punitive damages in light of their twin goals of punish-
ment and deterrence. In vacating the Ninth Circuit’s
judgment, however, the Court held that punitive dam-
ages in the circumstances of this maritime case were
limited to a 1:1 ratio to the jury’s $507.5 million award
of compensatory damages. Because the case was
brought in federal court under admiralty jurisdiction,
cases in which Congress has not expressly addressed the
extent to which punitive damages are available. And
upon close examination, it appears that the 1:1 ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages approved by the
Court is really a ﬂexible standard and very much de-
pendent on the circumstances of the case.
In cases applying the Court’s new federal common law
punitive damage standards, it will be necessary to deter-
mine what circumstances justify limiting punitive dam-
ages to a 1:1 ratio. Despite its preference for a numerical
as contrasted to a verbal approach to controlling punitive
damages and limiting their “stark unpredictability,” the
Court did not hold that the 1:1 ratio is the maximum
punitive damages ratio in all federal question cases much
less all maritime cases. Indeed, Exxon Shipping was an
unusual case, and the Court noted that the defendant
(whose reckless conduct the Court characterized as repre-
hensible) was not acting intentionally or maliciously and
was not acting “primarily by desire for gain.” See 128 S.
Ct. at 2633. These qualifying observations suggest that
the Court may permit higher ratios in maritime and
other federal question cases in which a defendant’s con-
duct is egregious. Likewise, the Court suggested that a
higher ratio might be proper when the wrongdoing is
hard to detect or when quantiﬁable damages are modest.
Finally and perhaps signiﬁcantly, the Supreme Court said
little about limitations on punitive damages in cases in
which there are only nominal damages (beyond recogniz-
ing their availability under the Restatement (Second) of
Torts). For example, in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247
(1978), a §1983 school suspension/due process case, the
Court made clear that a plaintiﬀ who could only recover
nominal damages could receive punitive damages. In
such cases (including certain First Amendment, voting,
and discrimination cases), where there may only be minor
quantiﬁable damages but intentional violations of the con-
stitution, a strong argument can be made that the 1:1 ratio
of Exxon Shipping is not applicable.
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the Court (in a matter of ﬁrst impression), acting as a
common law court, applied maritime common law to
limit the award of punitive damages. In so holding, it
distinguished the common law review in the present
case from Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process review of state court judgments (in which the
Court had deﬁned the outer limits of constitutionally
permissible punitive damage awards).
Under its constitutional review, the Supreme Court had
established a 10:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages as a presumptive upper limit, see State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.
408, 425 (2003) (stating that “few awards exceeding a
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, to a signiﬁcant degree, will satisfy due
process”), and it seems clear that the common law limita-
tion on punitive damages adopted in Exxon Shipping is
not directly implicated when the Court is reviewing state
court judgments under due process standards. This con-
clusion is strengthened by the fact that two members of
the Exxon Shipping majority, Justices Scalia and Thomas,
have steadfastly refused to place any substantive due
process limitations on the amount of punitive damages,
thus making unlikely the expansion of Exxon Shipping to
due process cases. Nonetheless, the Court has suggested
that in cases in which the compensatory damages are
substantial—perhaps anticipating cases like Exxon Ship-
ping—the 1:1 ratio may also be the constitutional ceiling.
See id. at 425 (“When compensatory damages are sub-
stantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to com-
pensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the
due process guarantee . . . .”)
Notwithstanding the limited holding of Exxon Shipping,
those supporting limitations on punitive damages will
likely argue that state courts should as a matter of state
common law follow the Supreme Court’s lead and mod-
ify their approach to punitive damages. And some state
courts (that are not operating under state caps or other
state statutory limitations on punitive damages) may ﬁnd
these arguments persuasive.
The most signiﬁcant impact of Exxon Shipping, how-
ever, will be on the amount of punitive damages that
state and federal courts may award in federal question
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“We have had occasion to note the striking resemblance between some of the laws we are called upon 
to interpret and King Mino’s labyrinth in ancient Crete.“
Lok v. Immigration and  Naturalization Service, 548 F.2nd 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
